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DARFUR, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, AND
UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Samuel Vincent Jones*

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE early morning sun bakes the calcified clay dirt of Sudan's Darfuri
landscape as families weep for the loss of loved ones from the previous
night's onslaught by Janjaweed Arab militia forces.1 Blood coats the already
slow-cooked earth. Babies clamor for something to eat, but with bones made
flaccid by malnutrition, they are unable to scavenge to satisfy their hunger. As
members of the African Zaghawa tribe make their way to water wells, planes
suddenly approach and bomb the area around the wells. 2 While the murder of the
innocent from the air continues, Sudanese soldiers and Jangaweed militia forces
surround the area and resume their indiscriminate killing of the defenseless
Zaghawa.3 The killing and screaming continues all day and does not stop until
nightfall.4
The next day, a man sits under a tree groaning from a gunshot wound to the
neck and jaw, "left for dead [on top of] a pile of corpses.
Under an adjacent
tree, widows cry over the bodies of their husbands who were shot to death. 6
Seeking shelter nearby, "a four-year-old orphan girl [attempts to care] for her
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1. The introduction is loosely drawn from Samantha Power, Dying in Darfur, NEW YORKER,
Aug. 30, 2004, at 58, and Nicholas D. Kristof, Reign of Terror,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2004, at A15.
2. Power, supranote 1, at 58.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Knstof, supra note 1, at A15.
6. Id.
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starving [one] year-old brother.",7 Under the tree next to her is the body of "a
woman whose husband [was] killed, along with her [two young sons], just before
she was gang-raped and mutilated."8
Such atrocities have become the norm in Darfur, Sudan. This may explain
why, on May 28, 2006, tens of thousands of chanting refugees confronted then
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan about the ethnic cleansing campaign and
widespread rapes occurring in Darfur. The refugees carried signs saying, "'We
are looking for freedom and justice,"' and "lined the muddy streets of Darfur's
largest refugee camp." 9 In recent years, Darfur has experienced some of the
worst violence in world history. In addition to systematic and widespread
murder, maiming, and rape, the people of Darfur are threatened by the worst food
shortage in decades. l The Sudanese government has reportedly restricted
humanitarian relief efforts, denied the existence of a humanitarian crisis, and
astonishingly, contended that fewer than 9,000 people have been killed."1 Yet,
media reports indicate that "more than 200,000 people have been [murdered] ...
[since] 2003,"12 and another 2.5 million people have been displaced from their
homes.' 3 The violence in Darfur and limited international response is strikingly
reminiscent of the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994. During which
time, approximately 800,000 civilians were killed-mostly with machetes-at a
rate approaching 8,000 per day.' 4 Meanwhile, the United Nations and its
member states sat idly by and watched on CNN.' 5
At least one member state has taken a different approach to the Darfurian
atrocities than it did with respect to the Rwandan genocide. The United States
characterized the atrocities in Sudan as genocide and called upon the United

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Annan Hears Refugees Tell of Sudan War, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, § 1, at 6.

10. The United Nations estimates that 70,000 deaths in Darfur are attributable to hunger. See
Robyn Dixon, U.N. Suspends Operations in Sudan-WorldFood Program'sDecision to Pull Out
of the Darfur Region Due to Renewed Violence Leaves 300,000 Without Help, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2004, at A3.
11. Alex Massie, No Genocide or Famine in Darfur,Insists Sudan, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Nov. 28, 2006, at 17, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/
11/28/wdarfur28.xml.
12. African Union Picks Ghanaianas Its Leader, in Snub to Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007,
at A3 [hereinafter African Union].
13. U.N. HumanitarianOfficial Says Darfur Crisis Is at Crucial Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2006, § 1, at 120.
14. Daniel Ellsberg, Contemplating a FatalMistake, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at A27.
15. Despite mounting evidence that indicated growing conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi
tribes in Rwanda, and that the Tutsi minority was being registered to facilitate the means by which
they would be exterminated, approximately 800,000 Tutsis were murdered because no state
intervened to stop the mass murders. See Joshua Kagan, Speeding Up the International
Community's Response Time in Addressing Acts of Genocide: Deferring to the Judgment of
Nongovernmental Organizations,34 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 145, 148, 151-52 (2006); Jaime Frederic
Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the InternationalLaw of Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628,
632 (1997).
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Nations to take action. 16 Ostensibly guided by the public conscience, the U.S.
Congress, in an unprecedented undertaking, has urged its President to "seriously"
consider "unilateral intervention to stop [the] genocide in Darfur, Sudan should
the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") fail to act."' 7 Given the growing
number of deaths in Darfur, it might seem that the United States' consideration of
unilateral humanitarian intervention 8 should be met with approbation rather than
cynicism, but nothing could be further from the truth. Despite the massive
atrocities observed, first in Rwanda and now in Darfur, a wide
number of
9
observers oppose the idea of unilateral humanitarian intervention.'
Contemporary posture typifies the idea that legal recognition of unilateral
humanitarian intervention would destabilize world order because some member
states would instigate ill-motivated hostilities under the guise of
humanitarianism, thereby reducing the efficacy and primacy of the UN Charter.
This article offers a new challenge to the pretext claim. By clarifying various

16. The Crisis in Darfur:HearingBefore the S. Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Colin L. Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
former/powell/remarks/36042.htm.
17. H.R. CON. RES. 467, 108th Cong. 10 (2004).
18. Unilateralhumanitarianintervention is a military intervention undertaken by a state, group
of states, or international organization, without target-state invitation or United Nations
authorization, to facilitate the restoration of human rights in another state. See Daphn6 Richemond,
Normativity in International Law: The Case of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 6 YALE
HuM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45, 49-50 (2003); Barry M. Benjamin, Note, Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention: Legalizing the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 120, 141 (1992-93).
19. See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139, 147-48 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) (arguing that

recognition of a right of unilateral intervention would act as a "general license" for vigilantes and
opportunists); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? 235-36 (2001); YORAM DINSTEIN,
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENCE 67 (3d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (advancing notion

that unilateral humanitarian intervention is too subject to abuse); LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 144-45 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that attempts to modify the use-

of-force provisions of the UN Charter on humanitarian grounds are "dangerous" because unilateral
humanitarian intervention is vulnerable to being used as a "pretext" for aggression); OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 126 (1991) (recognizing that although

humanitarian intervention is desirable, "it could provide a pretext for abusive intervention");
Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism ": Promise or Peril?, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 153, 160 (1999) (stating that humanitarian intervention has typically been a pretext for
war aimed at advancing the selfish agenda of the intervening nation); Thomas M. Franck & Nigel
S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J.
INT'L L. 275, 304 (1973) (questioning the credibility of unilateral humanitarian intervention
because of its potential to authorize nations to oppress other nations); Jules Lobel & Michael
Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease Fires and
the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 153 (1999) (reasoning that unilateral
humanitarian intervention could provide a blueprint for world powers to pursue "geopolitical
interest"); Jianming Shen, The Non-Intervention Principleand HumanitarianInterventions Under
International Law, 7 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 1, 10-12 (2001) (reasoning that humanitarian
intervention is nothing more than a "high sounding and convenient tool" for "powerful nations" to
conceal their intent to "dominate weaker states"); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of
Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EuR. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1999) (recognizing the merit of arguments
disfavoring unilateral humanitarian intervention because of the opportunity for abuse).
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ideas about the meaning and limits of law and examining how law emerges as a
practical authority, this article illustrates basic distinctions about the relationship
between law and morality. It ascribes validity to the integrative, condition based
approach to unilateral humanitarian intervention and renders doubtful the
pretextualist claim that the noninterventionist framework of the United Nations
Charter ("Charter") functions as an effective juridical construct.20 In so doing,
this article accepts the possibility of altruistic unilateral humanitarian
intervention.
II. THE POTENTIALITY FOR PRETEXTUAL WAR DOES NOT
JUSTIFY NONINTERVENTION

The ongoing human rights atrocities occurring in Darfur have drawn attention
to a preexisting debate and induced widespread concern regarding the
international community's remedial response to human rights crises. 21 The
concern is thoroughly justified with respect to Darfur for several reasons.
First, although the Sudanese government has reportedly abused its sovereignty
through its complicity in the killings,2 2 the Sudanese government claims that any
UN deployment without Sudan's consent would violate its sovereignty. 23 As a
result, the Sudanese government states that it would fight any uninvited foreign
peacekeepers.2 4 Sudan's claim is supported by a strict reading of Article 2(7) of
20. Part II examines the intuitive plausibility of viewing the current noninterventionist regime
of the Charter as an effective legal framework, given the aims and purposes of the Charter as a
whole. Part III considers whether the noninterventionist regime of the Charter, when strictly read,
is an authority capable of directly prohibiting a state's use of force. Finally, part IV introduces an
approach that would better enable the Charter to assert practical authority and more effectively
direct member state practice.
21. In 2004, the UNSC, in recognizing the widespread violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law exacted against civilian Darfurians, including rapes, murder,
displacement and indiscriminate attacks, determined that the situation in Darfur constituted a
"threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region." S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004), availableat http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/446/02/
PDF/N0444602.pdVOpenElement.
In 2007, the UNSC expressed grave concern over the
continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur and the impact on the region and
continued violence on civilians. See S.C. Res. 1755, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1755 (April 30, 2007),
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/325/27/PDF/N0732527.pdf?Open
Element.
22. M. Rafiqul Islam, The Sudanese Darfur Crisis and Internally Displaced Persons in
InternationalLaw: The Least Protectionfor the Most Vulnerable, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 354, 370
(2006).
23. It is widely accepted among commentators that the Charter's prohibition on the use of
force is only directed at "non-consensual interventions." See MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 64-65
(2005); Shen, supra note 19, at 6 ("[A] state is not subject to any form of foreign interference in its
own domestic matters except by consent.").
24. Lydia Polgreen, Sudan Releases an American Journalistfrom Jail in Darfur, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 2006, § 1, at 114; David B. Kopel et al., Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right?, 81
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1275, 1302-04 (2006). The UNSC can decide at any time that the effects of
Sudan's anarchy are intolerable and authorize military action simply by finding that the "magnitude
of human tragedy" created by the conditions in Darfur constitute a threat to international peace.
This position, without question, was the basis for the United Nation's military intervention in
HeinOnline -- 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 100 2007-2008
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the Charter,2 5 which is "premised on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and political independence, and is an adjunct to the principle of the nonuse of
force embodied in Article 2(4)26 of the United Nations Charter., 27 Together,
these provisions have generally been accepted as creating a "duty of
nonintervention., 28 This purported duty prohibits one state from interfering in
the internal affairs of another sovereign state without the consent of the target
state or authorization from the UNSC, 2 9 except in matters of self-defense
pursuant to Article 5130 of the Charter.
Second, political wrangling in the United Nations stymies remedial
progression and precludes UNSC authorization of military intervention without
Sudan's consent. The UN, therefore, is ill positioned to stop the atrocities in
Darfur, even though it is empowered to give such authorization pursuant to

Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. 3' For example, Russia, a permanent member

Somalia. See David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State
Consent, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209, 233-34 (1996) (citing S.C. Res. 794,
3, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992)).
25. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state ... but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.").
26. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
27. Ved Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-Revisiting the
Validity of HumanitarianIntervention under InternationalLaw-Part I, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 305, 307 (1991).
28. The General Assembly classifies the obligation as a "duty not to intervene in matters within
the domestic jurisdiction of any State." See Shen, supra note 19, at 5 (citing G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV), at 122, U.N. Doc. A/1889 (Oct. 24, 1970) (emphasis added)).
29. U.N. Charter art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security."). Observers interpret this provision to reserve to the UNSC the
right to use military force. Daniel W. Abbot, The United Nations and Intrastate Conflict: A
Legislative History of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
275, 275 (2002).
30. U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
31. U.N. Charter art. 41 ("The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations."); U.N. Charter art. 42 ("Should the
Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
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of the UNSC, sells fighter jets to Sudan and is unlikely to support interventionist
UN initiatives against Sudan without the acquiescence of the Sudanese
government.32 China, also armed with veto power as a permanent member of the
UNSC, "imports more than 64 percent of Sudan's oil"' 33 and has helped "Sudan
34
resist pressure [from] the United Nations ... to end [the] violence ... in Darfur."
China forced the United Nations to accept a condition that Sudan consent to any
deployment of UN forces.3 5
Third, the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
("Commission") disagreed with the United States' characterization of the
atrocities in Darfur as genocide. 36 Chaired by Antonio Cassese, a critic of the
Genocide Convention, who has long viewed the treaty as "ineffective" and a
proven "failure," 37 the Commission found that despite widespread mass killings,
genocide had not occurred in Sudan. 38 It did, however, find that the Sudanese
government's conduct constitutes crimes against humanity. 3
The Commission's findings on the issue of genocide in Sudan have produced
disagreement among observers. 40 One contention is that the Commission's
failure to establish a case for genocide substantially impedes any effective
international effort to stop the ongoing armed attacks against the unarmed

maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.").

32. Sudan Can't Wait, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2004, at 11.
33. Howard W. French, Chinese Leader to Visit Sudan for Talks on Darfur Conflict, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A6.
34. Keith Bradsher, Chad's Switch to Beiing's Side Draws Angry Response in Taiwan, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at A6. See also Richard A. Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of
InternationalLaw-Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REv. 231, 249-50 (1964) (reasoning that
problems of international law are especially prominent when controverted behavior is committed
by a member state that is able to block or influence censure in the political organs of the United
Nations).
35. Stephen Rademaker, Unwitting Party to Genocide, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2007, at A25. A
recent UNSC initiative to authorize deployment of up to 26,000 peacekeepers to Darfur, under the
day to day control of the African Union, proceeded only after the Sudanese government agreed to
allow the UN peacekeepers to enter Darfur. See S.C. Res. 1769, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July
31, 2007), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO7/445/52/PDF/N0744552.
pdfOpenElement; John Sullivan, U.N. Security Council Approves Joint Force of Up to 26,000
PeacekeepersforDarfur,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at A8.
36. Warren Hoge, U.N. Finds Crimes, Not Genocide in Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at
A3.
37. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 97 (2003).

38. Int'l Comm'n on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to
the UnitedNations Secretary-General, 640, (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Int'l Comm'n Report to
the Secretary-General], availableat http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com inqdarfur.pdf ("[T]he
crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government
authorities are concerned. Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly
displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in
part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds.").
39. See id. 293.
40. Nsongurua J. Udombana, An Escape from Reason: Genocide and the International
Commission ofInquiry on Darfur,40 INT'L LAW. 41, 41-42 (2006).
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civilian population in Darfur.4 1 On the other hand, Schabas observes that discord
over whether the Sudanese government's conduct "constitutes genocide or one of
its cognates, such as crimes against humanity," is relatively insignificant.42
Even if the Commission found that the Sudanese government implemented a
policy of genocide against its citizens, and thus violated the Genocide
Convention, such a finding would not impose any duty upon any member state to
act outside its own territory.43 The legal duties imposed under the Genocide
Convention have been interpreted to be very limited in scope, only requiring
member parties to prevent genocide from occurring within their own states. A
This juridical construct appears to virtually eliminate any prospect of stopping
genocide in circumstances in which the government is complicit in the killings.w
The United States' call upon the UNSC to stop the killings in Darfur, in fact,
represents the only time any party to the Genocide Convention has ever invoked
it as a mechanism to stop genocide since the treaty was adopted.46
Prior to the enactment of the Genocide Convention, the specific crime of
genocide lacked a significant presence within international criminal law. It was
not an even an offense considered by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg.4 7 Instead, conduct that could accurately be described as genocide
was essentially encompassed by the "persecution" part of the crimes against

41. Id.
42. William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of
Inquiry's Finding on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1703, 1704-05 (2006). See also Int'l

Comm'n Report to the Secretary-General, supra note 38, at 4 ("The conclusion that no genocidal
policy has been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the Government authorities, directly or
through the militias under their control, should not be taken in any way as detracting from the
gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region. International offences such as the crimes against
humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous
than genocide.").
43. David Luban, CallingGenocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin's Word, Darfurand the UN
Report, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 303, 305 (2006); Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of
Genocide, 26 WHITTIER L. REv. 1101, 1137 (2005) ("[T]he Genocide Convention does not create a
right or duty to engage in any form of humanitarian intervention over and above what conventional
and customary law may already provide.").
44. Luban, supra note 43, at 305 n.20 ("Article 1 of the Genocide Convention obligates its
parties to 'undertake to prevent and to punish' the crime of genocide, but Article 6 makes it clear
that the 'obligation to punish genocide applies only to genocide committed within the state's own
territory, and international lawyers generally assume that the legal obligation to prevent genocide
has no wider extension than genocide within a state's own territory."'). This conclusion is
reinforced by Article 8, which states that parties to the Convention may call on the UN Security
Council to take actions for prevention and suppression of genocide. Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 8, Dec. 8, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. There is no
suggestion that states must act on their own to suppress genocide in other states. Id. See also
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 491-502 (2000).
45. GEORGE J. ANDREOPOULOS, GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 3
(1994) (recognizing that one of the most fundamental problems with the Genocide Convention is its
reliance on the perpetrator of genocide, the state, to be responsible for its prosecution).
46. Scott Straus, Darfurand the Genocide Debate, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 123.
47. Madeline Morris, Genocide, Politics, and Policy: Conference Remarks, 35 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 205, 206 (2003).
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humanity offense contained in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter.48 In
addition, the term "genocide" is not incorporated anywhere in the text of the
Charter. Rather, behavior that amounts to genocide is addressed by the human
rights provisos of the Charter. 49 A specific finding of genocide by an
investigative committee, quite simply, does not create or dispel any legal rights
or duties relative to international efforts to prevent the continued murder and rape
of Darfurian civilians.
Despite the limited legal significance of the exact label, some observers
attribute the Commission's inability to treat the atrocities as genocide as the
central reason for the United Nations' dismal response to the tragedy.5 °
Meanwhile, the dire circumstances in Darfur reveal a truth of paramount
importance to the inquiry regarding unilateral humanitarian intervention-the
Darfur atrocities constitute an ongoing, government-inflicted human rights
catastrophe that must be stopped. But is unilateral humanitarian intervention an
appropriate remedy?
No international court has clearly addressed the issue of whether the unilateral
humanitarian intervention urged by the U.S. Congress is a viable legal
mechanism for stopping genocide or massive human rights atrocities. 51 Despite
voluminous research on the question of unilateral humanitarian intervention, a
definitive resolution of the legal issues has evaded seekers. 53 The fact that the
Sudanese government has been complicit in the mass killings of its citizens, and
the UNSC is virtually paralyzed by vetoes, or anticipation thereof, may lend
some support to the position that consideration of unilateral humanitarian
intervention is both legally and morally appropriate. Others disagree.
48. Charter of the Int'l Military Tribunal art. 6(c), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm#art6 (last visited July 24, 2007) ("Crimes Against Humanity:
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.").
49. See Carsten Stahn, Note & Comment, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or
EmergingLegal Norm, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 112 (2007).
50. Luban, supra note 43, at 304 ("The UN no longer knew what to do, because without the
word 'genocide,' the mandate for action disappears.").
51. The author recognizes that Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, (June 27), can be viewed as a rejection of unilateral humanitarian intervention, but posits
that the conclusion reached by the ICJ is more accurately limited to the "conduct of the United
States" under the facts before the ICJ at the time the case was heard.
52. For discussion regarding the great weight of scholarship that militates against the legality
or existence of unilateral humanitarian intervention, see Ian Brownlie, HumanitarianIntervention,
in LAW AND CIVIL WARS INTHE MODERN WORLD 218-19 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).

53. Some scholars contend that there is a right to intervene in the event of genocide, but
recognize that the question is less clear with respect to other human rights violations. See Klinton
W. Alexander, Ignoring the Lessons of the Past: The Crisis in Darfur and the Case for
Humanitarian Intervention, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 42 (2005); Gareth Evans, The
Responsibility to Protect:Rethinking HumanitarianIntervention, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 78,
79 (2004); Todd Howland, Evolving Practice in the Field.- Informing the International Legal
Obligation to "Protect," 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 89, 91 (2006) ("[T]here is not yet even
agreement on when there is an obligation to intervene in cases of massive refuges or genocide.").
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Considerable scholarship weighs heavily against the legality of intervention on
the grounds that the alleged right of unilateral humanitarian intervention is a legal
and moral fiction. 54 Many scholars argue that the duty of nonintervention,
The
specifically enunciated under the Charter, must be recognized. 5
predominant assertion is that legal recognition of a unilateral humanitarian
intervention right would undermine the United Nation's authority, under its
Charter, to curtail aggression.56 Observers claim that states would use unilateral
humanitarian intervention as a pretext for waging war. 57 Essentially, the
noninterventionist argument is that international order is maximized through
strict adherence to the text of Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter.58
A typical empirical premise of the noninterventionist argument is that states
historically have not engaged in unilateral humanitarian intervention because of
the authoritatively binding nature of the nonintervention framework, and that this
constraint will continue to guide the actions of state actors. This stance fails to
consider that behavior consistent with the law may actually be the result of
something other than obedience to the law by taking for granted the practical
effectiveness of the nonintervention juridical framework.5 9
When strictly read, the text of the Charter precludes unilateral humanitarian
intervention. There have been, admittedly, relatively few unilateral humanitarian
interventions. 60 While this fact appears to support the proposition that the strict
rule against intervention is preventing "pretextual" war, it is possible that what
nonintervention framework may actually
seems to be obedience to the Charter's
6
be the result of something else. 1
As legal philosopher Kent Greenawalt noted in his work on the limits of law,
"behavior [that is] in accord with [a] law does not necessarily [signify that law's]
effectiveness." 62 Rather, the behavior "may be the product of something other"
than observance of the strictures of that law. 63 For example, "if an automobile is
capable of going only 30 miles per hour, it is not the law that keeps the driver
54. Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality, and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after
Kosovo, 13 EuR. J. INT'L L. 323, 323 (2002).
55. See Simma, supra note 19, at 5 (citing United Kingdom Foreign Office Policy Document
No. 148, reprinted in 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 614 (1986) (stating that the three main reasons

weighing "against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention" are: (1) "the UN Charter
and corpus of ... international law do not ... specially incorporate ... a right of [humanitarian
intervention];" (2) "[s]tate practice in the past two centuries ... provides only a handful of genuine
cases of humanitarian intervention;" and (3) the scope of possible abuse of the right to
intervention)).
56. See supra note 19.
57. Id.
58. See Bartram S. Brown, HumanitarianIntervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1683, 1702 (2000).
59. See Kent Greenawalt, Some Related Limits of Law, in THE LIMITS OF LAW 76 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1974).
60. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 101 (1977) ("[C]lear examples of what is

called 'humanitarian intervention' are very rare.").
61. Greenawalt, supra note 59, at 77.
62. Id. at n.l.
63. Id.
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from exceeding a speed limit of 35 miles per hour," even though the speed limit
has not been violated.64 Similarly, Ronald Dworkin notes that not every act that,
in some literal sense, adheres to a principle or moral stricture constitutes
obeisance to the principle.6 5 For instance, a person who supplies their own
answers to a spelling test is not necessarily intentionally and consciously
observing the moral requirement not to cheat. 6v They may know the answers or
simply may be unable to see their neighbor's answers.
With these jurisprudential principles in mind, let us assume that there have
While most
been few instances of unilateral humanitarian intervention.
noninterventionists attribute the rarity of these instances to the effectiveness of
the nonintervention framework,67 the rarity of such conduct is probably more
accurately ascribed to a historical lack of appreciation for 6 the human rights
standards that now significantly influence international norms.

8

The Charter was created to regulate interstate relations rather than internal,
intrastate violations of human rights law. 69 Commentators note that only recently
has the international order developed "the relatively [simple] institutional
structures needed [to protect and] monitor compliance with basic human
rights., 70 This suggests that the rarity of unilateral humanitarian interventions is
64. Id.
65. See Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, andLaw-Observation Promptedby Professor
Fuller'sNovel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 668, 675 (1965).
66. Id.
67. The author concedes that as a matter of theoretical soundness, the lack of unilateral
humanitarian intervention may conceivably be explained by the lack of human rights violations
sufficiently severe enough to justify intervention. Such a finding is dismissive for practical reasons
given the atrocities that occurred in Rwanda. See Ellsberg, supra note 14, at A27.
68. Alexander, supra note 53, at 13 ("[A]s human rights have emerged as a major issue in
world politics over the years, international law has evolved to accommodate exceptions to the
principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention in international law."); Evans, supra note
53, at 82 ("The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is much strengthened by the everincreasing impact of international human rights norms and the increasing impact in international
discourse of the concept of human security. Sovereignty as responsibility is being increasingly
recognized in state practice. The adoption of new standards of conduct for states in protecting and
advancing international human rights has been one of the great achievements of the post-World
War II era. The Universal Declaration and the Covenants on civil and political and on economic,
social, and cultural rights mapped out the international human rights agenda, set the benchmark for
state conduct, inspired many national laws and international conventions, and have led to creation
of national infrastructures for protecting and promoting human rights. Accompanying all this has
been a gradual transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and
international accountability, with the international human rights norms and instruments being used
as the concrete point of reference against which to judge state conduct."); Jack Alan Levy, As
Between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law of Foreign Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Jus
Cogens Violators, 86 GEo. L.J. 2703, 2706-07 (1998) (recognizing that the corpus of jus cogens
humanum evolves over time because of the discovery and recognition of additional norms); A.P.V.
Rogers, HumanitarianIntervention and InternationalLaw, 27 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 725, 733
(2004) (reasoning that a recent trend in international practice has been to deviate from the longaccepted practice of noninterference when serious human rights violations have occurred).
69. Rogers, supra note 68, at 728.
70. ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF DETERMINATION 225 (2004); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Perennial Conflict Between International Criminal Justice and Realpolitk,
HeinOnline -- 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 106 2007-2008

Fall 2007]

UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

107

the result of a gap between preexisting norms and emerging social values, rather
than obedience to the strictures of noninterventionist legal constructs. That said,
even if one assumes that the rarity of unilateral humanitarian intervention can be
substantially attributed to strict observance of the Charter's nonintervention
framework by some states, the pretextualist argument is unpalatable. Indeed, the
avoidance of some pretextual wars due to strict observance of a nonintervention
regime comes at a terrible cost and calls into question its effectiveness.
Legal jurisprudence recognizes that a law is ineffective if it fails to contribute
to the realization of the goals it was intended or desired to further.71 When
examined under the lens of this jurisprudential principle, the premise of the
pretextualist claim becomes unsustainable when examined in relation to the
Charter's aim to protect and preserve human rights. Article 1(3) of the Charter
states that the United Nations exists to "achieve international cooperation ... in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedom for all.",72 The Charter's human rights provisions are phrased in terms of
encouraging cooperation to promote human rights.7 3 Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter also provide that all member states "pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of ...
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights. 74
Although the status of the human rights clauses of the Charter has been the
subject of much controversy, 75 international legal scholars have long established
that the member states' pledge to preserve human rights cannot be interpreted as
a mere declaration devoid of legal obligation.76 To make sense of this claim, we
must assume that the Charter's major aim is to preserve and protect international
human rights 77 while maintaining international security and peace. 78 Certainly,
22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 541, 542 (2006) ("In the last 50 years, national legal systems have
qualitatively advanced far more than during the preceding 7,000 years. This advance is largely due
[T]o some extent,
to the impact of international human rights norms on national legislation ....

this permeation of international human rights norms and standards has also occurred in the
international legal system.").
71. For example, few would deny that "a law against hunting deer, passed solely to protect
deer, would be ineffective if the consequence of obeying its commands is overpopulation of deer,
depletion of their food supply, and finally the starvation of them all." See Greenawalt, supra note
59, at 78.
72. U.N. Charter art. 1,para. 3.
73. See Jennifer L. Czernecki, Comment, The United Nations' Paradox: The Battle Between
HumanitarianIntervention and State Sovereignty, 41 DUQ. L. REv. 391, 394 (2003).
74. U.N. Charter arts. 55(c), 56.
75. See Richard B. Lillich, Invoking InternationalHuman Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54
U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 371-85 (1985).
76. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145-46 (reprint 1968) (1950).

77. Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter states that among the UN's purposes is to "achieve
international co-operation ... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedom for all." U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. The UN Charter's human rights
provisions are phrased in terms of encouraging cooperation to promote human rights. Czemecki,
supra note 73, at 394. Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter provide that all member states "pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the
achievement of ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights." U.N. Charter arts.
55(c), 56.
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the failure of the United Nations to abate atrocities, in Rwanda,79 Sudan,8 °
Bosnia, 8 1 and Iraq, 82 lends alarming support to this thesis and substantially
undermines the premise that strict adherence to nonintervention promotes a just
and efficient international order more effectively than unilateral humanitarian
intervention. The more critical point, for present purposes, is that if states resist
engaging in unilateral humanitarian intervention, despite witnessing mass human
rights atrocities, primarily because of obedience to the strict text of the
nonintervention framework, the Charter fails as an effective law. Primacy should
not be substituted for exclusivity. The Charter must be interpreted in a manner
that permits its human rights imperatives to be weighed equally alongside its
peace and security provisions. Such an interpretation would ban unilateral
humanitarian intervention only in cases where a territorial change is sought or the
political independence of the state is challenged. Without such findings,
unilateral humanitarian intervention not only fails to offend the nonintervention
framework, but would be consistent with the most fundamental purposes of the
Charter while facilitating its practical effectiveness.
The next section of this article considers whether the Charter's nonintervention
framework is capable of functioning as an authoritative instrument if strict
adherence to its literal terms becomes morally objectionable because of human
rights catastrophes. It argues that the nonintervention legal framework can
provide states with a reason to act or refrain from acting only if its obvious
justifications and aims are weighed against the moral imperatives inherent in the
corpus of the Charter's human rights text.
IlI.

THE CHARTER IS INCAPABLE OF PRACTICAL AUTHORITY UNLESS THE

NONINTERVENTION FRAMEWORK IS WEIGHED
AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS IMPERATIVES

States, like people, are fundamentally autonomous beings, responsible for
making moral judgments about how they ought to act.83 When an international
law demands that a state refrain from doing something, the demand interferes
with the state's autonomy, including the legal and moral right to deliberate, make
decisions,

and take

responsibility

for its own actions.84

Adherents

of

78. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 ("To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.").
79. Supra note 15.
80. More than 200,000 Sudanese people have been killed in Darfur. See African Union, supra
note 12, at A3.
81. In 1995, 7,000 men were executed in Srebrenica. See Marlise Simons, Court Still
Weighing Genocide Casefrom Milosevic Era,N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006, § 1, at 16.
82. Approximately 50,000 Kurds were murdered in Iraq in 1988. See Damien Cave, Defiant
Hussein Hails Insurgents and Clashes with His Judge, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A12.
83. Frank J. Garcia, Globalization and the Theory of International Law, 11 INT'L LEGAL
THEORY 9, 11 (2005).
84. See W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL
L. REv. 67, 94 (2005).
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nonintervention support this notion, arguing that by virtue of its legal obligations
under the Charter a member state has no right to exercise independent moral
judgment in determining what it will do in response to massive human rights
atrocities occurring within another state.
The noninterventionists' claim is that the Charter does not authorize any state
"to act, unilaterally, in the domain of human rights" despite the occurrence of
massive and repeated human rights atrocities; therefore, states may not
intervene. 85 To the extent this argument rests on the proposition that the
Charter's nonintervention framework postulates practical authority8 6 capable of
issuing exclusionary reasons for obedience, it departs from well established
jurisprudential principles. According to noninterventionist claims, the mere fact
that the Charter enunciates nonintervention provides states with a reason and
mandate for obedience that virtually supplants all reasons that could lead a state
This understanding of the
to disobey the Charter and intervene.
noninterventionist claim regarding the authority of the Charter's nonintervention
regime is strikingly similar to the legal theory advanced and defended by
Columbia Law Professor Joseph Raz,
87 who is recognized as the "most influential"
legal theorist on the law's authority.
Raz asserts that it is the very nature of authority that its directives do not
simply stand alongside other reasons for action, to be evaluated and weighed
among those other reasons. 88 In order for the Charter to carry practical authority,
Thus, when a state
it must be regarded as an authoritative directive.
contemplates unilateral humanitarian intervention, the Charter must be taken as
an instrument that supplants a state's reasons to intervene and removes the
possibility of unilateral action. The Charter should not constitute merely a single
89
powerful consideration to be weighed among the state's other considerations.
For Raz, the law functions as a mediator when viewed in this fashion.9 ° His
assertion is that before receiving an authoritative directive, "people are in direct
touch with a variety of moral and other reasons for and against actions they might
[take]." 9' Raz further contends that as
[a]uthority, [law] interposes itself between people and their reasons by
weighing and balancing those reasons and issuing a new, consolidating
directive that replaces those multitudinous considerations and factors with a
85.

DINSTEIN,

supra note 19, at 85 (reasoning that no state is "authorized" to act unilaterally,

despite mounting human rights atrocities, without UNSC authority).
86. JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 195 (1994) ("Legitimate authority is either
practical or theoretical. The directives of a person or institution with practical authority [are

reasons] for actions for their subjects, whereas the advice of a theoretical authority [is reason] for
belief for those regarding whom that person or institution has authority.").
87. Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified,90 MICH. L. REv. 2203, 2222 (1992).
88. RAZ, supra note 86, at 196-97.

89. Id.
90. Id.at 209-10.
91. Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1655, 1671 (2002) (reviewing JULES
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL

THEORY (2001)).
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single, exclusionary instruction. Those who accept the authority will
henceforth exclude [other] reasons [which] the authority has [already]
weighed for them from their own calculations [regarding] action and will
rely only on the new, authoritative, [directive]. 92
To offer a simplified example of authority viewed in this way, consider the
following: Passenger A and passenger B disagree about whether a certain road is
a shortcut route to an important meeting. If they agree, they can travel quickly
on the possible shortcut. Additionally, neither has reason to think a map will
distort the character of a road, as might be the case with a winding mountain
road; therefore, they believe they "can resolve [their] disagreement by looking at
a map.

'93

"The message communicated in graphic form by the map does not

become merely another reason [weighing] in favor of [one] passenger's
[position]. Instead, the map's statement becomes the only [basis or] reason on
which [the passengers will] act.",94 This illustrates "what it means for something
to be [authoritative] .... The only way for the map to become an authority is if

disputants adopt it as a reason for action that supplants the reasons that created
the disagreement. 96 "It does not matter whether [passenger A] thought the road
was a shortcut because it headed off in a southerly direction, or whether"
passenger A believed they used a shorter route in the past. 97 If the two
passengers continue "to consider those sorts of reasons after consulting the map,
[they will] be treating the map as something [less] than an authority. 9 8 Raz
posits that if the law is to be authoritatively binding, it must be accepted, as is the
map, "without reference to the underlying
reasons that had formerly counted for
99
or against the competing positions."
The reason that motivated the passengers to consent to the map's directive is
the basis for the map's binding effect. 00 At the same time, the reasons are
independent of each passenger's beliefs.' 0' That is, each passenger agrees to
abide by the map even if the map does not comport with his or her view of the
most efficient route.' 0 2 This conception of authority relies on one set of reasons
the passengers share-the desire for cooperation and use of the shortest routewhile not relying on the reasons about which they disagreed.'0 3 For the

92. Id.at 1671 (citing RAz, supra note 86, at 196-97). This conception of authority is not one
that everyone adopts. See id at 1668.
93. This example is drawn from Professor Bradley's analysis of the work of Joseph Raz. See
Wendel, supranote 84, at 106.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing RAz, supra note 86, at 212).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.(citing RAz, supra note 86, at 218).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
at 106-07.
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04
passengers, the map exerts practical authority because it is a reason for action.1
The map functions as a reliable standard for resolving the disagreement' 0 5
because its authority cannot be10called
into question by either passenger's view of
6
the map's validity or accuracy.
For the noninterventionist, the authority accorded the nonintervention
framework enunciated under the Charter resembles a Razian view of the map. In
this stance, the Charter interposes itself between states and provides a settled,
public, and dependable set of standards for resolving conflict. Further, the
Charter's force cannot be called into question by an individual state's conception
of the Charter's morality or ineffectiveness. The noninterventionist accords the
noninterventionist framework the same authority given to the map. That is, it
must be obeyed without recourse to other reasons or considerations.' ° 7
Although it may appear that the noninterventionist thesis fully comports with
that of Raz, nothing could be further from the truth. Unlike noninterventionists,
Raz concedes that a law may lack authority if its directives are morally
deficient. 10 8 As Raz observes, a person's authority may be denied or challenged
on the ground that he or she is morally incompetent or a wicked person. 109 In this
regard, Raz's concept of the law stands alongside that of Hart and Holmes, in his
assertion that the law is limited by morality and that the obligation to obey it may
be overridden in extreme cases."
There is much that can be said about the Razian concept of the law. Raz
bequeaths to us an idea of the limits of the law's practical authority that regulates
the dimensions of virtually any command. For example, if the map's directive is
to take a certain route that would severely damage the local food supply of a
starving community or injure deaf children who are wandering lost in the area;
the map's authority may be overridden because adherence to its commands
would engender an extremely severe and morally objectionable result. The same
can be said with respect to the commands enunciated in the Charter's
nonintervention framework. If adherence to its strict terms would facilitate the
continuation of a human rights catastrophe or moral atrocities, its authority may
be overridden, or at least reduced, and a state may intervene unilaterally.
This is not to say that a state may unilaterally intervene in the affairs of
another state to stop any immoral act. Such action would be incongruent with
well-established jurisprudential principles since one "may have a moral right to

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.at 106.
See id.
See id.
Id.at 106-07; Dworkin, supra note 91, at 1671 (characterizing Raz's position as an

argument for exclusive positivism).
108. RAZ, supra note 86, at 199 ("A legal system may lack legitimate authority. If it lacks
moral attributes required to endow it with legitimate authority then it has none."); id.at 218 ("A
person's authority may be denied on the grounds that he is morally incompetent or wicked.").

109. Id.
110. H.L.A.

HART,

THE CONCEPT OF LAW 225 (1961) (reasoning that the obligation to obey law

may be overridden in extreme cases); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
460 (1897) ("[Tlhe law, if not a part of morality, is limited by it.").
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do something ...
[morally] wrong,"'I which includes a right not to be interfered
with in doing the wrong.112 For instance, many might describe viewing adult
pornography, having an abortion, or spending millions on luxuries while loving
family members starve to death as morally wrongful acts; still, most would agree
that a person may claim the moral liberty to engage in such activities without
interference.
With respect to a state that instigates a policy of genocide or crimes against
humanity against its own citizens, no such moral "right to do wrong" exists.
"[O]ne cannot have a liberty right to do something that one has a duty not to
do."" 3 The UN Charter and the Genocide Convention, as well as various human
rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1 4 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 115 the American
Convention on Human Rights, 1 6 and the European
OR17 Convention on the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, inhere in states a duty to respect
and ensure the rights protected. This duty consists of a "negative duty not to
infringe on [human] rights." The duty renders dismissive any assertion that a
member state may claim a liberty right not to be interfered with when that state
breaches its duty and the interference is intended to enforce that duty.1"'
Despite the protestations of noninterventionists, the demands of practical
rationality and jurisprudential reasoning dictate that inherent in the duty to ensure
protection of human rights is the right to weigh the consequences of adherence to
the strict text of the nonintervention regime against those that would ensue from
a broader interpretation. This especially applies when a literalist approach
induces or allows massive human rights atrocities. Reliance on this principle is
111. Jeremy Waldron, A Moral Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21, 21 (1981-82).

112. Id.at 29 ("P has a right to do A is the correlative claim that other people are morally
required to refrain from interfering with P's performance of A. If P has a right to do A, then it
follows that it is wrong for anyone to try to stop P from doing A.").
113. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 120 (1993).

114. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. In
Article 2, the ICCPR obligates states to "undertake to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized" in the ICCPR. Id. at art. 2.
115. Adopted by the eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government on June 27, 1981,
OAU Doc. OAU/CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force-Oct.
21, 1987), available at http://www.achpr.org/english/ info/charteren.html. Article 2 guarantees
rights and freedoms "without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other
status." Id. at art. 2.
116. (Nov. 22, 1969), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673, (entered into force
July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention], available at http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American
Convention/oashr.html. Article 1 outlines State obligations to respect and protect rights and
freedoms. Id.at art 1.
117. (Nov. 4, 1950), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocols No. 3, 5 & 8 (entered into force
Sept. 21, 1990, Dec. 20, 1971, and Jan. 1, 1990, respectively) [hereinafter European Convention],
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Freaties/Word/005.doc. Article 14 recognizes the
obligation of States to "secure" the "enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" enunciated under the
European Convention. Id.at art. 14.
118. See HELEN DUFFY, Tif 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

301 (2005).
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particularly apt in situations when the UNSC is paralyzed by veto or anticipated
veto, and strict adherence to nonintervention would create, for the target
government, a liberty right to establish policies that "shock the moral
conscience" and violate universal notions of humanity." 19
Although this stance may be disturbing to legal positivists, 20 it is not by any
means novel within the sphere of international jurisprudence. International law
has long permitted notions of morality and public conscience to shape the
contours of international norms. 12 1 Even the foundational documents delineating
international humanitarian laws that regulate war include a provision known as
the Martens clause, which highlights the moral bases of humanitarian obligations
by referencing sentiments to humanity.' 22 The clause requires a person faced
with two possible interpretations, to proceed with the interpretation most aligned
with principles of humanity and morality.' 23 The Charter should and must be
approached in a similar, if not the same, manner.
The next section introduces a practical approach to unilateral humanitarian
intervention that attempts to safeguard moral objectivity and facilitate legal
order. This approach uses a condition based design that encourages member
states to balance the Charter's nonintervention framework with the emerging
moral values imbued in its international human rights imperatives without
sacrificing the general utility of law for moral arbitrariness. In doing so, it fosters
a solution that recognizes the general affinities between the interventionists and
noninterventionist claims relative to international legal order. The framework
also sets forth the proper relationship between law and morality as a means to
reduce dysfunctional and ineffective operandi attendant with UNSC paralysis or
inaction during international human rights catastrophe.
IV.

A MORALLY

EFFICIENT AND PRACTICAL APPROACH TO UNILATERAL
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IS IDENTIFIED

Not every law is moral or has a moral purpose. A rule of law may simply exist
because it is convenient, codifies common practice, or is necessary to establish
24
clear, fixed procedures relating to a particular problem or potential problem.
For instance, a law requiring four days' notice for document filing may very well
be adopted even though a three-day notice law would suffice.'
Indeed, there
119. WALZER, supra note 60, at 107 (stating that "the reference [is] to the moral convictions of
ordinary men and women, acquired in the in the course of their everyday activities," rather than that
of political leaders, who are typically "required to repress their normal feelings of indignation and
outrage").
120. It is generally accepted that legal positivist summarily dismiss the thesis that unjust or
immoral laws are not valid laws that must be obeyed. JEROME HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 23 (1973).

121. Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of PoliticalGenocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's
BlindSpot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2284-85 (1997).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. HART, supra note 110, at 223.
125. See id. at 223-24.
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are a multitude of laws that establish arbitrary distinctions, formalities, and
details.
These laws have no moral component, but still constitute a
comprehensible feature or process of a legal system. 126 As Hart observed, it is
for this reason that society expects law, rather than morality, to advise it of how
many witnesses a validly executed will must have or how long one has to file an
appeal. 127
Of course, this is not the status of the Charter. It cannot be viewed as a
moralistically void legal construct, given its proclamations with regard to human
rights and its need to assert practical authority. Any approach that fails to
consider the moral imperatives inherent in its human rights provisions reduces
the Charter to a law devoid of moral purpose or validity.
While morality is not uniform or universal and can engender uncertainty and
unpredictability, the law facilitates order. 128 Hence, moral principle alone may
not constitute sufficient grounds for unilateral humanitarian intervention. States
can reasonably disagree about the appropriate moral response to genocide and
other massive human rights atrocities. Any approach that relies predominantly
on the moral judgment of member states as the proper mechanism for
international responses to human rights atrocities might indeed facilitate
ubiquitous subjectivity and selectivity in the application of military force. To
allay such concerns, the threshold for unilateral humanitarian intervention must
meet specific requirements, which Nicholas Wheeler asserts must include: (1) "a
supreme humanitarian emergency"; (2) "the use of force ... [as] a last resort";
(3) the use of force must be limited by the proportionality standards enunciated
under International Humanitarian Law; and (4) "a high probability' 29 that the use
of force will achieve a positive humanitarian outcome." ' 30 While this criterion
encompasses vital safeguards, unilateral humanitarian intervention should be
limited to circumstances in which the UNSC is paralyzed by veto or anticipated
veto and a majority of General Assembly members, after having considered the
abovementioned criteria, agree, via resolution, that unilateral humanitarian
intervention is warranted.
These additional conditions are appealing in at least two regards beyond
recognizing the primary responsibility of the UNSC to decide such matters when
unobstructed by veto. First, although General Assembly resolutions are usually

126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Any level of unpredictability in this regard, however, may be appropriate, given that an
approach that makes a government that enacts a policy of genocide or crimes against humanity
against its citizens susceptible to unpredictable military intervention is less morally objectionable
than an approach that permits such a government to commit human rights atrocities with impunity
because it can predict that the UNSC will not authorize military intervention.
129. Few would deny that there are risks and unknowns associated with the use of military
force. For this reason, this author accepts the premise that there can be no guarantees of a favorable
outcome to any armed conflict and, therefore, any discrepancy between the legitimate justification
for unilateral humanitarian intervention and the outcome of the campaign does not disprove its
moral validity or weaken the legitimating reasons that are claimed to have motivated the unilateral
humanitarian intervention.
130. NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS 33-34 (2000).
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not binding on states,13 1 such resolutions may represent persuasive authority with
respect to what international law should be relative to unilateral humanitarian
intervention. 132 Second, this General Assembly based resolution approach is
consistent with the General Assembly's authority to study and make
recommendations regarding "the realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all," found in Article 13 of the Charter.13 3 In addition, precedent for
this approach was established by the Unitingfor Peace Resolution,' 4 which was
specifically designed to create a decision-making role for the General Assembly
in situations when, as with the crisis in Sudan, the UNSC becomes paralyzed by
veto or bias and fails to discharge its responsibilities.' 3 5
Upon
General
Assembly recommendation,
unilateral humanitarian
intervention should be deemed appropriate when it meets certain conditions,
which Richard Lillich argues have generated broad consensus. The conditions,
for which I concur, include:
(1) The intent of the [intervening state] must be to intervene for as short as
time possible, with the [intervening state] disengaging as soon as the
specific limited purpose is accomplished; (2) Where at all possible, the
[intervening state] must try and obtain an invitation to intervene from the
recognized government and thereafter, to cooperate with the recognized
government; (3) The [intervening state], before its intended intervention,
must request a meeting [with the UNSC] in order to inform it that the
humanitarian intervention will take place only if the [UNSC] does not act
first; and (4) Before intervening, the [intervening] state must deliver a clear
ultimatum or peremptory demand to the concerned state insisting that
positive actions [must] be taken to terminate or ameliorate the gross human
rights violations. 36

131. Jean-Marie Henckaerts,

Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A

Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 175, 179 (2005).

132. Samuel V. Jones, Has Conduct in Iraq Confirmed the Moral Inadequacy of International
HumanitarianLaw? Examining the Confluence Between Contract Theory and the Scope of Civilian
Immunity DuringArmed Conflict, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 249, 287 (2006).
133. U.N. Charter art. 13, para. I(b).
134. G.A. Res. 377(V),
1, U.N. GAOR, 5th Session, Supp. No. 20 at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(Nov. 3, 1950), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/landmark/pdf/ares377e.pdf.
135. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, 309-10 (3d ed. 1962); G.A. Res. 377,
supra note 134, at 10 ("Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its
responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in
the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United
Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,
Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or
relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace

and security.").
136. WHEELER, supra note 130, at 42 (citing THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON THE
INT'L PROT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY GEN. INT'L LAW, ILA REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SIXTH CONFERENCE

217 (New Delhi 1974)).
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In addition to the aforementioned conditions, it appears appropriate to require
that: (1) the intervening state agrees not to use its military force to change the
territorial integrity of the targeted state; (2) the findings of a United Nations
Commission of Inquiry indicate that the targeted state's government is complicit
in actions that constitute massive human rights atrocities against its own citizens;
(3) the intervention is supported by at least two permanent members of the
UNSC; (4) the intervening state has enacted national legislation or published a
policy recognizing unilateral humanitarian intervention as a viable option under
its domestic laws and defined the circumstances under which intervention will be
deemed proper; and (5) criminal charges against the targeted government were
referred to the International Criminal Court or brought before the International
Court of Justice.1 37 It is hard to deny that the "United Nations, [as an]
international organization composed of sovereign states and committed to the
[preservation] of sovereignty and territorial integrity, is [inaptly suited] to
gunciatc prc.... L-,,noainst fellow member states. 1 38 Recognizing that any
establishment of a pragmatic legal regime relative to unijateiial huma-itarian
intervention would be vulnerable to political and economic constraints, these
conditions should not be construed as exhaustive.
V. CONCLUSION

Given the gross atrocities presently occurring in Darfur and previous
international crises, it cannot be denied that the nonintervention framework
enunciated under the Charter effectively accomplishes its protective goals to a
limited extent. This article has attempted to clarify various ideas about the
meaning and limits of law and examine how law emerges as a practical authority
capable of providing its subjects or signatories with a reason to act. By weighing
the noninterventionist interpretation of the Charter against contemporary theory,
this article illustrates basic distinctions about the relationship of law to morality
and how morality may inform the normative character of international law.
The approach proposed here, if applied objectively, would provide a viable
blueprint for member states to balance the Charter's nonintervention framework
against emerging international human rights imperatives,1 39 the corpus of which
137. The Commission's findings regarding Darfur were referred to the International Criminal
Court. See Mike Corder, Suspect Named in Darfur War Crime Case, S.F. GATE, Feb. 27, 2007,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2007/02/27/international/i33053
S19.DTL. On February 27, 2007, the ICC prosecutor named former Sudanese Junior Minister,
Ahmed Muhammed Harun, and a militia leader, Ali Mohammed Ali Abd-al-Rahman, as suspects in
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. Id.Sudan, however, rejected the authority and
jurisdiction of the ICC and claimed it will not hand the two men over. Id.
138. ANDREOPOULOS, supra note 45, at 3.
139. Klinton Alexander, NATO's Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating
Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 403, 441-42 (2000) (recognizing that NATO's authority to intervene in Kosovo did not arise
from provisions of the Charter, but from "an emerging [moral imperative] codified in the body of
international law that permits intervention for humanitarian purposes"); Howland, supra note 53, at
114 ("It is becoming increasingly clear that at least in the human rights area, many actors have a
responsibility or legal obligation."); Nanda, supra note 27, at 306.
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is largely regarded as a peremptory norm or jus cogens. 140 If the conditions
proposed under this approach are adhered to, the contemplated intervention
would not offend the duty of nonintervention delineated in the Charter since the
intervention would not facilitate a change in the territorial integrity of the
targeted state. 4 1 To the extent a state's unilateral humanitarian intervention
under the conditions advanced in this article can be said to violate the strict
boundaries of the noninterventionist framework, the deviation is acceptable for
several reasons. First, international jurisprudence has long recognized the right
of a state to depart knowingly from what had been established law or treaty
interpretation in the hope of changing the law.142 Second, a state that breaches its
duty not to commit crimes under international law may not claim a right of noninterference relating to the commission of those crimes. Finally, any harm to
state sovereignty that may result from interventions initiated under the model
proposed here is outweighed by moral imperatives attendant to altruistic
objectives aimed at restoring human rights.
The claim that states will coerce or dominate their neighbors under the guise of
humanitarianism or moral imperatives does not require or warrant a
noninterventionist to deny the need for intervention. Rather, such a claim only
requires a noninterventionist to deny intervention legal recognition while,
simultaneously, accepting it as a viable moral choice of states outside the realm
of law. 143 The assertion that unilateral humanitarian intervention may be morally
permitted, but should not be legalized because of the danger that such a legal
right would be abused, is untenable as it merely underscores an apparent conflict
44
between morality and legality that fatally weakens international law.
Moreover, this position implies "that international law is incapable of ensuring
145
respect for socially indispensable standards of morality."'
Not only does this posture jeopardize the practical authority of international
law, it is inconsistent with long standing juridical principles regarding
sovereignty. A review of the legislative history of the Genocide Convention
reveals that since the Nuremberg Tribunals, international scholars have
recognized that a state relinquishes certain sovereign rights when it severely

140. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992) (It is a doctrine of treaty law that is codified under Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.); Van Schaack, supra note 121, at 2272 ("Jus cogens ...
norms
sit at the apex" of the international law hierarchical framework.); id. at 2272-73 ("A jus cogens
norm is a binding and nonderogable rule of law which is peremptory in the sense that it is binding
irrespective of the will of the individual parties, in contrast to jus dispositivum, a rule capable of
being modified by contractual engagements."). See also Alexander, supra note 53, at 41 (reasoning
that "humanitarian intervention is justified to prevent" genocide because genocide is ajus cogens);
Schabas, supra note 42, at 1718.
141. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian
Intervention:Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter,4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 253-54 (1974).
142. Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama under InternationalLaw: A Gross Violation, 29
COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 311 (1991).
143. WALZER, supra note 60, at 106.
144. WHEELER, supra note 130, at 41.
145. Id.
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abuses human rights. 146 As Louis Henkin observed, imperatives regarding the
preservation of human rights have significantly eroded traditional notions of state
sovereignty. 147 According to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, "no
legal principle-not even sovereignty-should ever be allowed
to shield
148
genocide, crimes against humanity, and mass human suffering.',
Sovereign states, such as Sudan, "that systematically murder, rape, [and
displace] their own citizens, [are not] shielded against intervention [because of
sovereignty].' ' 149 To the extent the Charter can be interpreted as granting Sudan,
or any rogue regime, an unfettered right to sovereignty despite its policy of
genocide, crimes against humanity, or other massive human rights violations, this
article calls for an interpretation that permits a state to unilaterally intervene on
humanitarian grounds. This posture, which recognizes the right of states to
unilaterally intervene on humanitarian grounds, without the consent of the
sovereign state, in order to protect the targeted state's citizens from massive
human rights violations, is recognized by many scholars. 150 Moreover, both
146. S. REP. No. 100-333, at 3-4 (1988) ("The tribunal was a watershed in international criminal
law, as it eroded the previously accepted principle of exclusive domestic jurisdiction in the area of
human rights."). See also WALZER, supra note 60, at 101 ("[Wlhen a government turns savagely
upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a political community to which the idea
of self determination might apply.").
147. Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et
Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1999).
148. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General,In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rightsfor All, 129, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (2005), available at
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/ [hereinafter Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom].
149. BYERS, supra note 23, at 92. See also Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, supra note
148; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 140, at 442-43 (recognizing that there is a
substantial body of opinion and of practice supporting the view that when a state commits cruelties
against its people and denies them fundamental human rights, humanitarian intervention may be
legally permissible); Kopel et al., supra note 24, at 1322 n.194 ("The Genocide Convention
[represents] a limited waiver of sovereignty and it obliges signatory states to disregard another
nation's sovereignty when necessary to halt genocide."); Michael J. Levitin, The Law of Force and
the Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and HumanitarianIntervention, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J.
621, 652 (1986) (reasoning that states that commit massive human rights violations forfeit their
legitimacy).
150. BUCHANAN, supra note 70, at 430; W.E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 30203 (4th ed. 1895); AMos HERSHEY, ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND
ORGANIZATION 239 (1927); Adam Roberts, The So-Called "Right" of HumanitarianIntervention,
in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOL 3, 2000, at 3, 50 (H. Fischer & Avril
McDonald eds., 2000); Jeremy Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors in Internal
Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333,

375 (1998) ("[T]here has been a shift in the law de legeferenda, permitting unilateral humanitarian
intervention by groups of states and regional actors in internal conflicts."); Anthea Elizabeth
Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation,
95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 768 (2001) (commenting that due to NATO's intervention against the
former Yugoslavia, unilateral humanitarian intervention may be established as a legal right);
Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323, 340-41
(1996); Steve G. Simon, Comment, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 117, 144 (1993) ("[N]ations do possess the right to intervene
unilaterally for humanitarian purposes in both rescue and non-rescue cases so long as the
intervention is done properly.").

See generally INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
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recognition and championing of this stance are necessary if the Charter's
nonintervention framework is to be an effective instrument that carries practical
authority.

Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 185
(2002).
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